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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//EventXplore//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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UID:4a8d1774-000c-49bc-8645-7f2795ebd47f@eventxplore
DTSTAMP:20260928T200152Z
DTSTART:20261006T190000Z
DTEND:20261006T201500Z
SUMMARY:Enemies in Agreement: Political Volatility and the Design of Arms Control
DESCRIPTION:About the event: Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition\, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits\, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes - such as leadership transitions or social unrest - can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncer
LOCATION:Encina Hall
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